Brexit and Causal Strands
Brexit,
the British exit from the European Union is at the tail end of an extraordinary
succession of events—the Syrian civil war, the forced migration of thousands of
refugees, the flight of desperate families to the West, the German impulse to
act morally by accepting refugees, the European Union’s less than willing subordination
to German policies, Islamic fundamentalist violence in the heart of
Europe, Eastern Europe’s anxiety about
being overwhelmed with foreigners they could not support and did not trust, and
Russia’s impulse to destabilize the European Union, one reason among several of
why it has supported Syria’s Assad.
These casual strands merged in Brexit as the people of
“little England” recoiled from the prospect of being overwhelmed by refugees, while
also being drawn to the prospect of revitalizing their cultural identity separate
even from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In this regard, they participated
in a pan-European movement that calls into question the salience of nations as
loci of identity, as is evident in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders and Northern Italy.
One serious question is whether this new localism will strengthen or undermine
democratic traditions. Both Russia and China have staked out a future in which
democratic practices are subordinate to the rule of elite cliques who seek
legitimacy by mounting programs of imperial expansion. A weakened democratic Europe
strengthens their political and moral legitimacy.
In responding to the initial phase of the Syrian conflict
in 2011, as Jeffrey Goldberg reports in his comprehensive article in the Atlantic, Obama felt that engaging directly
in the Syrian civil war would distract him from a larger and more longer-term
agenda of confronting China in the East. As he notes, Obama, “Gets frustrated
that terrorism keeps swamping his larger agenda, particularly as it relates to
rebalancing America’s global priorities. For years, the ‘pivot to Asia’ has
been a paramount priority of his. America’s economic future lies in Asia, he
believes, and the challenge posed by China’s rise requires constant attention.
From his earliest days in office, Obama has been focused on rebuilding the
sometimes-threadbare ties between the U.S. and its Asian treaty partners, and
he is perpetually on the hunt for opportunities to draw other Asian nations
into the U.S. orbit. His dramatic opening to Burma was one such opportunity;
Vietnam and the entire constellation of Southeast Asian countries fearful of
Chinese domination presented others.” This is also why he mobilized twelve countries
in the Pacific Rim to create a free trade zone, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as a counter to China’s own expansion in
the region.
Yet, as the sequence
of events outlined above indicates, the Syrian crisis, in its wider meaning, influences
China’s ability to project its power. What we face here is the complexity of
causal strands. In one tradition of thinking, associated with the work of Fred
Emery and Eric Trist, this complexity gives riser to our experience of turbulence.
Obama can plan for the rise of China by looking to East Asia, but fail to
anticipate the rise of China as one end result of the crisis in the Middle
East.
One question is, should we and can we hold our leaders
accountable for anticipating the evocation of these causal strands? I want to
distinguish here between foresight and
insight. Obama demonstrates foresight
in creating what he and his advisors have called the “pivot to Asia” as the
primary focus of his foreign policy. It takes account of the obvious fact that
China is a rising power, whose mercantilism --it's press to secure trade
channels for its imports and exports --underlines its globalist stance.
The problem with this forecast is that it is in fact both too obvious and too simple. For example, it does not take account of the forces for stability and instability in China itself. The Communist Party’s claim to its monopoly on decision making rests in part on its ability to secure economic growth while limiting corruption. But is this twin goal achievable?
The problem with this forecast is that it is in fact both too obvious and too simple. For example, it does not take account of the forces for stability and instability in China itself. The Communist Party’s claim to its monopoly on decision making rests in part on its ability to secure economic growth while limiting corruption. But is this twin goal achievable?
State-owned and locally-owned government enterprises play a
significant role in the Chinese economy. This gives the Party leverage over the
scale and scope of economic activity. But it also means that party-members, their
families and their political allies can control enterprises without being
accountable to customers, investors or the public. As Daniel Bell of Tsinghua
University writes, “The overall level of corruption
has exploded over the past three decades, and it has become a visible political
problem the past few years due to the glare of social media and more
conspicuous consumption by political elites.” It is reasonable to ask if the Party
can enforce a corruption free culture while also limiting the rule of law.
After all, the best vehicle for limiting corruption is a free press and
independent courts. But should the latter institutions develop, they would
threaten the Party’s monopoly over political life.
Moreover, corruption is also self-reinforcing. People who
hold an image of the state in their mind as “corrupt” treat the state’s
institutions badly. Why protect these institutions when they are the source of
ugliness and the venue for other people’s corrupting activities. Instead, they
should be exploited. This is why corruption stimulates what political
scientists and economists call “rent seeking activity” as party-members work to
secure resources through state-owned and state-influenced enterprises without
regard for the wider and longer-term impacts of their decisions on the fabric
of urban and rural life.
It is also why wealthy Chinese look for safe havens for
their money abroad. For example, Bloomberg News reported in November of 2015 that China’s
wealthy citizens were sending money overseas, “at unprecedented levels to seek
safer investments — often in violation of currency controls meant to keep money
inside China. This flood of cash is being felt around the world, driving up
real-estate prices in Sydney, New York, Hong Kong and Vancouver…While this
year’s numbers aren’t yet in, during the three weeks in August after China
devalued its currency, Goldman Sachs calculated that another $200 billion may
have left.”
This is also why Chinese enterprises take decisions without
regard for the longer-term impacts of their activities on pollution, food safety,
and the quality of construction. If an executive’s self interest is focused on
his or her extended family, and he or she sees settings outside China as vehicles
for accumulating family wealth, why worry about the longer term impacts of
their investment decisions within China. But as these severe indirect effects
of economic activity take hold of, and reshape, urban and rural life, political
instability increases. This can lead the Communist Party to try to exert even
greater control, through undemocratic means, triggering yet again the cycle of
corruption and its untoward consequences. In Albert Hirschman’s inimitable terms,-- “exit, voice and loyalty” -- the wealthy cannot exercise their
“voice” in an undemocratic setting, nor are they “loyal” to the ideals of the
Party that has long ago forsaken them. So they must prepare for the possibility
of exit.
Of course, I am writing out a forecast or a “scenario,”
which we could name, “China’s Communist Party undermines its own legitimacy.”
No one can tell now whether it or not is accurate. Nor is it clear how, should
such a scenario come to past, the “pivot” to Asia would increase, decrease or
render irrelevant current, U.S policies in East Asia. But it does highlight how
the interplay of causal strands makes a long-term vision and its associated
forecast a problematic foundation for strategy formation. Indeed, management
theorists such as Elliot Jacques, Russell Ackoff, and Eli Goldratt, who have
examined the challenge of forecasting in some depth, have concluded that
forecasting is a fool’s errand. Instead, executives should focus on constructing a desired future rather
than trying to anticipate one.
But in some degree this perspective kicks the can down the
road. One cannot construct a future, particularly one based on a long-term time
horizon, without at the same immersing oneself in the immediate causal strands
that create the conditions for the elaboration of any desired future. In this
sense there is no escaping the present moment, what psychoanalysts refer to as
the “here and now,” and Kurt Lewin, one of the founders of social psychology,
called, “the force field.” This stance, I suggest, is the
foundation stone for insight and is best vehicle for assessing if and how the
Syrian crisis provides a new venue for the projection of Chinese power. In other words, insight is a precondition for foresight. But is
it possible to effectuate such a stance and should we hold our leaders to
account for this kind of understanding?
Philip Tetlock and the
Super-forecasters
I am drawn
here to Philip Tetlock’s work of assessing how effectively
people can in fact forecast political
events, for example the likelihood of a war, a coup, a riot, a strike, or a
secession. He found surprisingly, that generalists were better forecasters than
experts with specialized knowledge of particular countries, regions or
disciplines. To use Tetlock’s term,
experts often predicted no better than “dart throwing chimps.”
Why should this be? Surprisingly, temperament plays a role.
The best forecasters had an ironic stance toward the judgments they made, were
less emotionally connected to particular forecasted outcomes, were more “actively
open-minded” in their consideration of information, blended different
perspectives, tended to see events in the round, that is, as instances of a
larger class of events rather than as unique stories, were skeptical of
deductive reasoning, were more likely to question analogies, and could
decompose likely events into the separate components that underpinned them. Following
the philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor, Tetlock characterized these good
forecasters as” foxes” who know many things if sometimes superficially, rather
than as “hedgehogs” who know only one big thing in depth, as experts do.
One basic reason foxes outperformed hedgehogs is that the
former reason from a “base case” and use statistical reasoning, while hedgehogs
rely on the emotional salience of a particular story or case. For example, I
might ask you to estimate the likelihood that a young suburban couple without
children and with a good income, has a pet. Perhaps you, like most people, would
turn the question into a story about how such a prototypical couple would
conduct their lives, investing the story with emotional meaning. For example,
you might imagine that the couple has discretionary income and no children, and
so are likely to have a pet to keep them company, perhaps as a trial for their
later child bearing and rearing. By contrast, the good forecaster starts with the base rate and
asks, “What percent of households own pets?” (the answer is 62%), and then
revises this estimate based on the additional facts provided. (Some readers
will recognize this as a form of Bayesian reasoning.)
Consider as well the following example. As Tetlock reports,
“In 2013 the Obama administration nominated Chuck Hagel to be defense
secretary, but controversial reports surfaced, and a hearing went badly, and
some speculated that Hagel might not be confirmed by the Senate. ‘Will Hagel withdraw?’
wrote Tom Ricks, a defense analyst. ‘I’d say 50-50 but declining by the day.
Bottom line: Every business day that the Senate Armed Services Committee
doesn’t vote to send the nomination to the full Senate, I think the likelihood
of Hagel becoming defense secretary declines by about 2%.’”
Tetlock compared this forecast to a super-forecaster who
reasoned statistically, noting that, ‘Since the establishment of the secretary
of defense position soon after World War II, it looks like only one of 24
official nominees has been rejected by the Senate, and none has withdrawn. So
the base rate is 96%.’ Using statistical reasoning analogous to the way in which we evaluate whether or not someone has
cancer, just because he or she tested positive for cancer, the super-forecaster
predicted that Hagel had an 83% chance of being nominated, which in fact he
was. One reasonable hypothesis is that Ricks, the defense analyst in Tetlock’s
example, was drawn to the emotional drama of Hagel’s confirmation hearings --
to the story of the possible rejection of a nominee and implicitly his
president --and that this story biased his judgment about the facts shaping
Hagel’s prospects.
Cognitive psychology, helps explain this phenomena. Daniel
Kahneman, the major theorist of cognitive biases, argues that people are prone
to an “availability bias,” the tendency to use available
examples and stories, often with emotional salience, as the basis for making
meaning of a situation. We reason from the inside out, ”How are pets substitute children?” rather from the outside in, “What are the many
reasons that people own pets?”
The Case of Libya
Compelling emotions probably distorted Hillary Clinton’s
judgment when she supported using U.S. air
power to interdict Gaddafi’s troops in Libya. In retrospect, the intervention
to topple Gaddafi turned out very badly. As one author wrote in the Journal, Foreign Affairs, “Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has
devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights abuses have
increased several-fold. Rather than helping the United States combat terrorism,
as Gaddafi did during his last decade in power, Libya now serves as a safe
haven for militias affiliated with both al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS). The Libya intervention has harmed other U.S. interests as
well: undermining nuclear nonproliferation, chilling Russian cooperation at the
UN, and fueling Syria's civil war.”
At the time of the Libyan intervention, March 2011,
the Arab Spring was bringing democracy
to Tunisia, Mubarak had recently been
deposed in Egypt, and ISIS was still an embryonic terrorist group. There were
grounds for optimism. But let me suggest that this optimism was distorted by a
kind of romanticism. Most telling, Christopher Stevens, later appointed as the
American ambassador to Libya after Gaddafi’s overthrow, released a video to the
Libyan people, shortly before he travelled to aid in the rebellion, comparing
their revolution to the U.S. Civil war. This analogy suggests that Stevens and
others thought it reasonable to hope that any post-Gaddafi Libyan leaders would have
the caliber of an Abraham Lincoln, that is leaders who could oversee
catastrophic destruction while planning for a post-war setting where, “malice toward none and charity toward all” would reconcile grievous enemies. But
in fact, the U.S., in supplying 20,000 tons of weaponry to anti-Gaddafi
militias, wound up buttressing hard core Islamic Jihadis. As one reporter notes, “That they were the heart of the opposition was inevitable: Salafist
Sunni jihadis had been Gaddafi's principal opposition for more than three
decades.”
In advocating for intervention, Clinton bet on Mr. Jibril,
who as head of the Transitional National Council, became Libya’s interim
prime minister after Gaddafi’s overthrow. Yet he was a political scientist with
a doctorate from the University of Pittsburgh, who had weak ties to Libyan
tribes and sects. Reflecting later on his failure to build an institutional
framework that supported liberalism and democracy, he noted that, “We had a dream, and to be honest with you, we
had a golden opportunity to bring this country back to life. Unfortunately,
that dream was shattered.” The notion of a “dream” particularly in a deeply
factionalized society, evokes the image of romantic rather than pragmatic
aspirations. Indeed, one possibility is that Christopher Stevens’ later murder
in Benghazi also highlights the romanticism of the moment. He did not attend to
his own security, because he underestimated the venom associated with tribal
and religious warfare.
Detached Immersion
Many of the findings associated with the literature on
cognitive bias and decision making are linked to the broader idea that people
do not naturally think in terms of probability and statistics. Stories pull
them toward what is specific and unique rather than what is general and rule-governed.
But the “probability way of thinking” entails a level of abstraction from everyday life, and in that regards
constitutes a burden on cognition. One measure of civilization’s progress is
the degree to which the senses are subordinated to thoughts, whether in
science, in the use of money -- now only digits on a computer disk -- or in the
concept of regularities that govern social life. This is also why modern
societies are vulnerable to attacks on science as a mode of thought, the
quintessential expression of abstraction, even though science has provided so
many benefits.
I want to suggest that Tetlock’s findings point to a mode
of apperception consistent with the demands of abstraction, which I propose to call, detached
immersion. This term is paradoxical for good reason. On the one side, there
is no substitute for engaging with the “here and now” in all its complexity, with
Kurt Lewin’s force field. But this engagement should be accomplished through a stance
of emotional detachment. Immersion draws our attention to the obvious fact that
any future will and must emerge from the present. Detachment ensures that we
are not seduced by the emotionally compelling stories we tell ourselves about
the present. In describing the analyst’s
stance toward a patient, the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion counseled attending to
the present moment in the analytic process, “without memory or desire.” This too
is a good model of detachment as a vehicle for gaining insight and guiding
intervention.
One hypothesis is that Obama, in confronting the Middle
East, uncharacteristically lacked
detachment. He pivoted to Asia to escape from the ugliness and hopelessness of
the Middle East. Yet early in his presidency he invested in the image of
himself as a leader who could help reconcile the Arab world to modernity, by
offering its people and their leaders understanding and respect. This was one meaning
of his speech entitled, “A New Beginning,” that he delivered in Cairo in 2009. Yet
he ultimately failed as an agent of “hope and change” in the region. This undermined
an idealized image he had of himself as a global leader, and according to this
hypothesis, he turned away from the Middle East in part to protect his
self-esteem.
Purposes versus objectives
I raised the question at the beginning of this post about what
should we hold our leaders accountable for when they make strategic decisions? One
answer is that we expect them to take pragmatic decisions based on detached immersion.
But there is fly in the ointment here, one that Tetlock identifies as a
limitation of this own research. His super-forecasters were great at answering
questions, “Will Russia stay the course in Syria until Assad wins, will Saudi
Arabia reduce its support for Wahhabi Imams in other countries, will Hungary withdraw
from the EU? But who determines what the best questions are? Who are the “super-questioners?
In the normal course of executive decision-making our best questions
come from our objectives. If, for example, as the owner of a small business in
the U.S., my objective is to start selling my products abroad, my questions are
all about how to accomplish this. My scenarios are about what obstacles I may face
in pursuing this objective, and my plans are about how to overcome these
obstacles. But in the turbulent environment we are describing, objectives are
forever unstable, always undermined by the unexpected confluence of causal
strands.
Brexit is the quintessential case in point. The main
elements of the Conservative party’s platform in 2015, as reported by the BBC, were to reduce the deficit, extend
the right of housing association tenants to buy the homes they lived in, to
increase spending on the National Health Service, and to sponsor a referendum on Great Britain’s membership in the
EU. David Cameron sought the referendum for tactical reasons; to unite the
Conservatives, contain the challenge on his right from the UKIP, and “give
himself the space to implement his legacy agenda of One Nation reforms to
improve people’s life chances.”
But Brexit upended all these objectives and raised serious
questions about the capacity of either Labour or the Tories to govern, and
about the integrity of Great Britain as a federation of identities. One
hypothesis suggested by Russell Ackoff’s thinking is that under these
conditions leaders are guided by ideals or purposes rather than goals and
objectives. It then becomes a matter of statecraft to determine what objectives
under present conditions best instantiate these purposes. To use an analogy,
purpose is to an objective as climate is to weather. Moreover, purposes are not so much achieved as they are
expressed. For example, if my purpose is to conduct my business
honorably, I don't achieve honor by a certain targeted date. Rather I instantiate
it everyday in the pursuit of my objectives.
To be sure, the moral quality of a purpose is contingent
and is in the “eyes of the beholder.” To give an example, one hypothesis is
that Putin’s political strength comes from his singular purpose of reanimating Russia as
an empire, an identity it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Or China’s purpose is expressed in its mercantilism,
that is, to secure for its 1.36 billion people (!), an unimaginably large population,
the resources it needs to advance its citizens’ living standards. Similarly, in
the 19th century, people in the United States imagined that they had
a “manifest destiny” to expand westward and appropriate the whole continent, even
when this meant riding roughshod on Native Americans. The power of purpose is
that it confers flexibility in the face of turbulence. As causal strands
intersect and upend inherited objectives, purpose readily directs the search
for, and discovery of, new ones.
The rise of China, Russia’s adventurism, the image of the
EU as an undemocratic polity, and the belief that democratic capitalism is
inequitable, all raise questions about democracy’s viability. It is reasonable
to ask if the United States could take up the purpose of representing the moral
meaning of democratic traditions and practices throughout the world. This is
what Christopher Stevens, the ambassador murdered in Benghazi, represented. But
there is a sense in which the U.S. has soured on this purpose, no doubt partly
in response to what Trump derides, quite reasonably, as its failed attempt at nation
building in Iraq. Libya in this sense was simply a repetition. Perhaps Trump’s dark
speech in accepting the Republican Party’s nomination for president resonates,
because in a time of terror preserving safety is the overriding purpose.