We think of stock
market as an indicator of economic activity. But it is also an indicator of the
emotions associating with investing, and more broadly with our shared images of
the future. If the market signals our collective “greed and fear, these
feelings only highlight that our experience of an unknowable future leaves us
vulnerable to primitive emotions. This was the basis after all for Allan
Greenspan’s, the chair of the Federal
Reserve Bank, famous speech in which he worried that the stock market,
responding to the dotcom boom of the 1990s, was expressing “irrational
exuberance.”
If we take this
point of view, one presenting question is what emotional meanings can we glean
from the stock market today? What might it tell us more broadly about the
emotional current that underlies our hopes and fears about the future, not just
of the market or the economy, but also of society more broadly?
There is little doubt that the market has been going up since the great recession. But what has been most worrisome is that the volume of shares traded has actually been falling. As the following graphs shows, trading volume has risen along with prices in the past, but since the Great Recession it has been declining, and markedly so since 2011.
Writing as early as 2012 The New York Times reported that, “Trading in the United States stock market has not only failed to recover since the 2008 financial crisis, it has continued to fall. In April, the average daily trades in American stocks on all exchanges stood at nearly half of its peak in 2008; 6.5 billion compared with 12.1 billion, according to Credit Suisse Trading Strategy. The decline stands in marked contrast to past economic recoveries, when Americans regained their taste for stock trading within two years of economic shocks in 1987 and 2001. This time around, the stock market has many more players, including high-speed trading firms, which have recently come to account for over half of all stock market activity. But even they, like all other major groups, have recently been doing less overall trading. ‘When you keep in mind recent history, this is kind of uncharted territory,' said Justin Schack, an analyst at Rosenblatt Securities.”
Ben Hunt, a
colleague and a brilliant analyst of the stock market, writes that, "Since
the outbreak of the Great Recession, with a few exceptional months marked by
panic selling, trading activity in US equity markets has done nothing but go
down. And when you take into account the growth of algorithmic trading and
other machine to machine activity which now accounts for as much as 70% of
daily trading volume, the decline in actual human beings buying or selling
stock in order to acquire a fractional ownership share in an actual real-world
company is much more dramatic. (http://www.salientpartners.com/epsilontheory/) Hunt calls this the “hollow market,” bringing
to mind T.S. Elliot’s great poem which ends with the famous phrase,
“This is the way the world
ends,
This is the way the world
ends,
This is the way the world
ends”,
Not with a bang but a whimper.
Safety: Strikingly, traders have organized their buying and selling to feel increasingly safe rather than at risk. The Chicago Board Options Exchange markets an index called the ‘VIX’ that traders can buy and sell. The index is based on a weighted average of options contracts*(see footnote), that in turn is based on 500 stocks that trade on the New York Stock exchange and the NASDAQ. When the index is high, traders expect more volatility in the market. When it is low they expect less. It is therefore often called the “fear index,” since it measures the degree of turbulence and thus uncertainty in in the market. As the following chart shows, the level of fear has fallen significantly since 2009, and hence the corresponding sense of safety has increased
The sense of safety matches the strength of corporate balance sheets in the economy at large. One measure of corporate leverage is the ratio of the corporate sector’s net debt (debt minus its cash on hand) to its earnings. To use an analogy, one way to assess if a family is highly leveraged, and thus financially vulnerable, is to compare its debt relative to its family income. This measures the family’s ability to pay off its debts and not go bankrupt. In the prelude to the Great Recession many families had too much debt relative to their incomes. Currently, this ratio for the corporate sector as a whole, net debt to earnings, has fallen by 2/3 since the beginning of the Great Recession. The corporate sector is not leveraged and companies in the main are not vulnerable to sudden downturns. They are safe. This is what we mean when we say that a company’s balance sheet is “strong.”
Dependency: Stock Market
participants increasingly focus on the Federal Reserve Bank (“the Fed”) and its
likely decisions, to the exclusion of assessing the fundamentals of the
different sectors of the economy, or the performance of different
companies. As Hunt argues, “Over the past five years an extremely powerful narrative has been created,
what I call the Narrative of Fed Omnipotence – whatever happens in the market,
for good or for bad, happened because of what the Fed did, not because of what
happened in the "real" economy.” (http://www.salientpartners.com/epsilontheory/notes/The_Risk_Trilogy.html). This is one result of the Fed’s historically unprecedented policy of
creating enormous reserves in the banking system-- see the chart below -- so
that interest rates, which measure the balance between the supply and demand
for capital are close to zero.
The Fed's primary purpose was
to insure that all member banks had adequate cash, and that companies, the
banks’ depositors, would not go bankrupt because their assets were illiquid.
This was a sensible response to the cash crunch associated with the initial
stages of the Great Recession. But one untoward effect has been to inflate the
value of most stocks, irrespective of their individual performances, as investors
search for ways to earn more than minimal interest on their cash holdings. In
effect, the stock market goes up not so much because the business prospects for
the future are good, but because there are few alternative ways to earn a
return.
This argument suggests that stocks are in fact overvalued. Indeed, one way to assess its overvaluation is to the
total value of all stocks on the market, what is called the market’s “total
capitalization,” relative to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or total measured
production. This ratio measures how productive our total wealth, the sum of all
of our capital assets, is in producing the income we use every year to both consume goods
and services, and to invest in the economy. To use an analogy, it is
like measuring the value of a house relative to the annual rents it brings in.
When this measure is too high relative to historical standards, we suspect
that the home is overvalued, signifying perhaps a bubble in the real estate
market. Its value is not consistent with the rents it brings in.
The decline of difference. One feature of the Fed’s impact on the stock
market is that increasingly stocks move together rather than separately based
on companies’ underlying differences. Modern portfolio theory, which lies at
the heart of much investing practice, sums up to a simple maxim, that to be
successful one must not put too many eggs (money) in one basket (a stock). This
means that investors should diversify their holdings by identifying stocks
whose movements up and down are not correlated. But one impact of the Fed’s
central role in shaping the market narrative is that stocks increasingly move
in concert rather than on the basis of their distinctions. Dependency decreases differentiation.
about 60%
in the fall. This is higher than during the burst of the Internet bubble or the
1987 stock market crash.” (http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/11/30/how-the-correlation-bubble-hurts-us-all/).
This correlation is one reason for poor hedge
fund performance. Hedge fund traders make their living by detecting
differences, for example by anticipating that some stocks will go down while
others will go up. As correlations between stocks and classes of stocks rise,
it is harder for hedge funds to make money. As a Bloomberg, January 2014 news item reports, “Hedge
funds trailed the Standard & Poor's 500 Index (SPX),
a measure of the stock market, for the fifth straight year.”
The Inward turn: There are two conceptions of how the stock
market moves. We can call one the “fundamental” view, and the other the
“sentiment” view. The former is based on investors’ assessments of the real
profitability of companies and sectors. The latter is based on assessing what
other investors think and feel about the market. Ben Hunt uses the analogy of
the poker game. If you trade on fundamentals you are focused on the cards in
your hand and what you think you know about the cards in other players’ hands. If
you trade on sentiment you focus on what the other players might be thinking
about their cards and your cards. Both perspectives are critical. The good
poker player plays the players as well as the cards. Warren buffet is a
fundamental investor who plays the cards, while many active traders, particularly those that monitor
stock charts, are focused on what everybody thinks, and what everybody thinks
everybody thinks. They play the players. Describing the market climate today, Hunt writes, “The market will go up because every investor will believe that every other
investor heard what Famous Investor X said, and every investor will be forced
to update his or her estimation of what every other investor estimates… That’s
how the sentiment game works.” (http://www.salientpartners.com/epsilontheory/notes/A_Game_of_Sentiment.html)
The stock market’s “flavor” is based partly on
the proportion of these two strategies.
One hypothesis is that in a period when the Fed is
the most powerful player and stocks
moves up and down together, investors turn increasingly inward toward the stock market itself and away from economic reality. Opportunities to profit arise not
because companies perform differentially, but because a trader has been able
to intuit the intentions and moods of other traders. This is why it is so
important for traders today to focus on the unemployment rate. If the rate
falls, it may signal that the Fed, anticipating real-economy growth, will at
long last stop buying bonds from the public. If they reduce their demand for
bonds, bond prices will fall and thus the interest rates will rise, thereby increasing
the attractiveness of bonds relative to stocks. So time to sell stocks. But if the labor participation rate, the
proportion of all people who either have jobs or are looking for them falls,
then the Fed, concerned that people are giving up looking for work, might buy more bonds, further lowering the
interest rate. So time to buy stocks. The
most salient questions becomes, “What is the Fed thinking?” and "What are other investors thinking about what the Fed's thinking?"
turns increasingly away from the fundamentals. This represents a flight from reality. The inward turn also
accounts for the centrality of business shows on television. The shows’ anchors
rarely offer considered or thoughtful advice, they are paid to be flagrant.
Instead, since everybody knows that everybody is watching these shows, they
provide some insights into what everybody knows what everybody knows.
The Anti-work climate
If I were to describe
a work group to you in the following way; its member seek safety, there is
unusual dependence on a single leader, differences are only minimally
acknowledged ,and group members focus inwardly on their own group dynamic
rather than their surround, I think you would conclude that this group is not prepared to work, that it lack’s
vitality, and may be even characterized as depressed or lifeless. Using group-dynamics theory, we would characterize
the collective mood of such a group as “anti-work.” We mean by this that though
the group has been called upon to ostensibly accomplish some work, its members
act instead as if they were called upon to satisfy their leader, keep one
another safe, or feel gratified by ensuring that everyone thinks
alike. If we look upon the stock market as the collective expression of our
relationship to the work we are called upon to do together --to invent new
technologies, to build businesses, to produce products that satisfy customers
-- we could say that the stock market is expressing just this mood of
anti-work, this lack of belief in our ability to be productively engaged in
economic life. Perhaps as the following chart shows, this is one way to interpret the growth in the number of people who are no longer employed and are no longer looking for work at all.
It is striking in
this regard that two mainstream economists, Larry Summers, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYpVzBbQIX0) the former Secretary of the Treasurer in
the Clinton administration, and Paul Krugman the Nobelist and columnist for the
New York Times, (
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/secular-stagnation-coalmines-bubbles-and-larry-summers/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0) have both suggested that we may be facing a period of what they call “secular
stagnation.” a more technical term for "lifelessness." In the spirit of Keynesian economics this means that however low
the interest rate, investors and businesses cannot be induced to spend their
money on capital goods, that instead, in their flight to safety, they prefer to
hold risk-free treasury bills, even when the return on these bills is close to
0%, if not zero itself.
But the presenting question is why do we face such a
situation? It takes but a few minutes of reading MIT’s Technology Review or the magazine, Scientific American, to be impressed by the extraordinary
technologies, that with sufficient effort and investment, await us in such areas as new biological
drugs, nano-technology, quantum-computing, solar energy, nuclear fusion, Big
Data, 3-D printing/manufacuting and agile robots. Why would an economy and
society be stagnant in the face of such opportunities? The current mood and the prospects for
stagnation beg for an explanation, for an understanding of the social and
psychological barriers we ourselves have constructed and that are now getting in
our own way.
* When a trader buys an options contract he buys the
right but not the obligation to buy or sell a stock at particular price, called the strike price at
a specified time in the future, say 30 days. If in 30 days the strike price is
below the actual price, and he now has the right to buy the underlying stock,
he can make some money by executing the option and then selling the stock. If
the strike price is at the actual price or higher, his contract expires, and he
is “out of the money.”